RISK: Health, Safety & Environment (1990-2002)
Volume 5
Number 3 Symposium on Technical Risk in the
Mass Media

Article 9

June 1994

Mass Media As an Information Channel and Public Arena
Hans Peter Peters

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/risk
Part of the Cognition and Perception Commons, Communication Commons, Environmental Sciences
Commons, and the Science and Technology Studies Commons

Repository Citation
Hans Peter Peters, Mass Media As an Information Channel and Public Arena, 5 RISK 241 (1994).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of New Hampshire – Franklin Pierce School
of Law at University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in RISK: Health,
Safety & Environment (1990-2002) by an authorized editor of University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository.
For more information, please contact ellen.phillips@law.unh.edu.

Mass Media as an Information Channel
and Public Arena
Hans Peter Peters*

Introduction

Mass media are often criticized for the way they present risks. They
are accused of either not warning their readers or viewers enough, or of

exaggerating and sensationalizing the risks, thus undermining public
acceptance of technologies and encouraging sub-optimal individual and
political decisions.' Such a line of media criticism is also to be found
in the work of media researchers such as Stanley Rothman and S.

Robert Lichter, Eleanor Singer and Phyllis Endreny, and Hans Mathias
Kepplinger, who in one way or another compare media coverage of risks
with scientific risk assessments. The arguments presented by these
authors are at first glance convincing and support popular assessments
of mass media. The empirical evidence on which they ground their
arguments seems to be valid. Yet, their judgments are based on several
value premises and normative expectations about the media that ignore
important aspects of mass communication.
This widespread media criticism has challenged and stimulated my
own work on mass media risk communication. Feeling that (even good)
journalists would not act the way the critics expect, and that if they did
their readers would not like such risk reporting, I tried to make explicit
the reasons for the contradiction between apparently reasonable
criticism and journalistic practices. This led me to a perspective on mass
media risk communication that I will briefly explain here.
*
Dr. Peters is a social scientist at the Jiilich Research Center and teaches risk
communication and empirical communication research at the University of Mfinster.
After two years as a journalist, he studied physics and social sciences at the Universities
of Cologne and Bochum and received his Ph.D. from the Ruhr-Universitit Bochum.
1 Bernard Cohen, Nuclear Journalism: Lies, Damned Lies, and News Reports, 26
Policy Rev. 70 (1983)
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Certainly there are good reasons to criticize the media. Drastically
simplified, and without qualifications always made by those who
criticize, risk coverage and journalistic treatment of risk issues are often
superficial and faulty - and rely too much on standard news sources.
Also, coverage may personalize responsibility for damages, rather than
relate it to social and political decisions, i.e., the structure of the "risk
society." Nevertheless, in this essay'I try to will show the difficulty of
finding hard normative ground from which to assess mass media
coverage of risk.
Technocratic Media Criticism
The above-mentioned criticisms take as a starting point a position I
call "technocratic" because it assumes that risks are known to technical
experts and that risk reporting should popularize the experts'
knowledge. This is the view of the scientific and technological elite.
I do not deny the value and even necessity of expert knowledge for
making good individual and political decisions. My main concern is
how public communication affects the way individual and societal
decision-makers use expert knowledge. I seriously doubt that
organizing the public discourse along experts' frames and priorities
as the technocratic model assumes - best solves this problem.
Technocratic media critics, and others, hold the normative
expectation that it is the mass media's first task to provide their
audience with a "true" representation of risk reality. This often means
not only that individual statements dealing with risks should be true,
but also that the statistical distribution of media statements about risks
should meet certain criteria: The relative quantity of coverage about
different risks should correspond to the relative size of the risks,2 the
ratio of statements referring to risks and benefits should correspond to
the respective risk-benefit-ratio, 3 the overtime trend of the quantity
2 Barbara Combs & Paul Slovic, Newspaper Coverage of Causes of Death, 56
Journalism Q. 837-843, 849 (1979) and Eleanor Singer & Phyllis M. Endreny,
Reporting on Risk. How the Mass Media Portray Accidents, Diseases, Disasters, and
Other Hazards (1993).
3
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of coverage of particular hazards should reflect the time trend in the
development of these hazards, 4 and the presentation of expert
opinions should reflect the proportions of experts who hold these views
so that a lone dissenter is not "balanced" against the nearly consensual
view of other experts. 5 The main judgment standard is scientific
Ctruth" against which coverage is compared in one way or another.
This technocratic approach, measuring media coverage against
scientific "truth," may be questioned in at least four ways:
(1) There is not always a scientific consensus in the assessment of a
risk. The most interesting and controversial risk issues are those where
experts disagree. Even when there is a widespread consensus among
experts, this consensus often exists only within a scientific and
technological community committed to the development of a
technology and hence is neither unbiased nor perceived as unbiased.
(2) Laypersons' risk construct and risk-benefit analysis, although
different from those of experts, may nevertheless be perfectly
"rational." The critics forget that scientific concepts, measurements and
indicators are merely constructs, focusing on some aspects of reality
and ignoring others. If we look, e.g., at the experts' risk construct in the
field of nuclear safety, we find that only certain causes of damage and a
limited spectrum of effects are considered, that only direct
relationships between risk source and possible damage enter their
model, that qualitative risk factors - related to a complex pattern of
preferences of laypersons - are ignored, and that the probabilistic
6
nature of accidents is the only source of uncertainty they treat. The
experts' risk construct certainly includes several important aspects and
hence contributes significantly to our understanding of the nature of
Akzeptanz von Technik in der Bundesrepublik (1989) and Singer & Endreny, supra
note 2.
4 Kepplinger, supra note 3.
5 Stanley Rothman & S. Robert Lichter, The Nuclear Energy Debate: Scientists,
the Media and the Public, Public Opinion, Aug.-Sept. 1982, at 47.
6 Hans Peter Peters, Durch Risikokommunikation zur Technikakzeptanz? Die
Konstruktion von Risiko"wirklichkeiten" durch Experten, Gegenexperten und
Offentlichkeit, in Risikokommunikation. Technikakzeptanz, Medien und
Kommunikationsrisiken 11 (Jens KrUger & Stephan Russ-Mohl, eds. 1991).
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nuclear risk, but compared to the spectrum of reasonable objections
against nuclear power, it is a narrow approach.
(3) Even when there is a broad consensus on the risk constructs of
experts and laypersons, it seems doubtful that the main task of mass
media is to mirror the reality of physical risk. Analyses by Allan Mazur
suggest that mass media coverage is a good indicator for the activities
of social actors (in his case the antinuclear movement) and probably an
even better one if coverage would be compared to the activities of all
social actors involved in the political process. 7 Hence, media
recipients may find information from and about political actors and
processes rather than information about the physical environment. If
media coverage were primarily linked to expert judgments that would
imply a predominance of experts in the public political process.
(4) Recipients of mass media have certain information demands
which are not related to "problem size" as defined by experts. Even
rational people may not wish to hear or read about risks in the mass
media if they have already made a decision or feel they have no choice,
if they have access to more specific and credible information channels
(e.g. physicians, personal experience), or if they think that risk
management is in competent hands. Regardless of the experts' risk
estimates, people want to read about risks in mass media primarily if
they might be affected by decisions of others and if there are indicators
(conflict, involved interests) that institutionalized risk management
might fail. To understand risk coverage one has to look for social and
political factors accompanying the risk problem rather than for
technical aspects of the risk. Coverage according to the technocratic
point of view would certainly disappoint reasonable and legitimate
expectations of the audience.
Functions and Modes of Mass Media Risk Communication
Media reporting according to the technocratic model would have
severe deficits from the point of view of public decision-making as well
as from the point of view of recipients' information demands. To assess
7

Allan Mazur, The Dynamics of Technical Controversy (1981).
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the performance of risk coverage, it seems useful to distinguish two
complementary perspectives on mass communication.
First, mass media are information channels distributing information
from social actors (e.g., government, agencies, stakeholders) to the
public. Journalists may select, edit and comment on this information;
but most information published in the media comes from powerful
social actors. Mass media are therefore a means for political, economic,
cultural and other elites to inform, educate and influence the public.
The information flow is more or less in one direction: from the elites to
the mass audience. Secondly, mass media are also a channel of indirect
and public communication among social actors. A statement by a
stakeholder published in the media will likely stimulate a response by
another stakeholder. Very often political controversies are accompanied
by a public exchange of statements from the involved parties.
This arena function of mass media is crucial for democratic mass
society. Compared to other (parliamentary, bureaucratic or legal)
arenas, the media arena has unique features such as its unlimited topical
scope, publicity, openness to new "players," and public interest as a
norm of reference. 8 These features make the mass media a flexible
arena; it can deal with topics and issues that are ignored by other arenas,
and it thereby serves as a kind of supervising and integrating institution.
Whenever something goes wrong in another arena (according to at least
one social actor with access to journalists), the mass media arena may be
called in to deal with the subject.
Any evaluation of mass media performance must recognize both
media functions. The technocratic media criticism, however,
contemplates only its information distribution function and assesses this
function solely from the viewpoint of the scientific and technological
elite. Mass media deal with scientific and technical issues (and risk
issues certainly have such aspects) in different ways. At least one can
8
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Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie. Special Issue, Offentlichkeit und Soziale
Bewegungen (1994, in press).
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distinguish three ideal types of mass media risk communication which I
label popularization, public education and technological controversies.
Popularization, as the classical journalistic approach dealing with
science and technology, tries to explain scientific questions, methods
and results to nonscientists to let them share knowledge developed by
scientists. This kind of communication leaves it to recipients to use such
information, if indeed it has practical relevance, and to draw
conclusions from it as best they can. Popularization is largely done by
specialized journalists (science writers) and effectively reaches only a
particular (scientific literate) public.
Public education means to provide members of the general public
with information useful for acting reasonably as an individual in
everyday life or as a citizen in the political process. Often public
education tries to convince the public to do or to avoid certain things
such as, for example, smoking, drunk driving, seat belt use, condom
use, crime prevention or opposing a technology. Public education
differs from popularization by the persuasive intent to change attitudes
or behaviors. Hence, communication as public education implies that
the communicator not only knows what is true, but also what is right
and good.
Communication about risks as public technological controversy
evolves if there are competing claims of factual truth which are based on
(not necessarily the same) scientific evidence promoted by different
political and scientific actors. Publicly fought technological
controversies immediately question the validity of the scientific
knowledge and the credibility of the experts representing the
competing scientific points of view. The "translation" and practical
application of scientific knowledge is not the main concern of journalists but rather the social conflict associated with different practical
conclusions drawn from and/or legitimated by scientific knowledge.
Journalistic practices in dealing with risk issues vary significantly
with the communication mode. While questions of audience relevance,
comprehensibility or even compliance govern risk reporting as
popularization or public information, the valid assessment of the
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competing conclusions becomes the most important reference point for
media reporting in technological controversies. However, since in most
cases neither journalists nor their audience possess scientific and
technical competence, the criteria used to evaluate the validity of
competing claims are mostly nontechnical. Laypersons, for example,
use their social competence to build expectations on likely biases of the
involved social actors and their factual claims. This implies an
information demand very different from that of an expert. While an
expert would probably ask about the number of animals involved in an
animal experiment regarding the toxic effects of a chemical, the
statistical significance of the results and - probably - the scientific
reputation of the experimenter, laypersons may be most interested in
who paid for the study and who profits from the results. It is the
question of credibility which comes into play here and where there is
evidence of elaborated mental models laypersons use to process social
and political information rather than technical information 9 .
It is also in this third communication mode of technological
controversies that the arena function of mass media becomes important.
If there is no consensus among the relevant social actors, arenas are
required to unfold the conflict and to resolve it by means of consensus,
compromise or legitimate political or legal decision. The mass media
arena is particularly important in the first stage, when the controversy is
unfolded. It prevents the exclusion of relevant interests or social actors
from the decision-making process in the more closed bureaucratic,
scientific, legal or parliamentary arenas. However, the mass media arena
is quite problematic in the phase of the resolution of controversies,
because it suppresses ambiguous and compromising opinions, thus
polarizing the debate, and it seduces the social actors to communicate
strategically, making it difficult to find a consensus or compromise.
Rather than to reach conclusions or to make decisions itself, the mass
media arena influences the problem-solving and decision-making
processes in the other arenas, thereby correcting biases of these arenas.
9 Hans Peter Peters, The Credibility of Information Sources in West Germany
after the Chernobyl Disaster,1 Public Understanding of Science 325 (1992).
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Journalistic Goal Conflicts and Mass Media Coverage as Compromise

In the previous section I have argued that mass media risk coverage
is composed of journalistic products prepared within different
communication contexts and that it makes sense to assume at least two
broadly defined functions of mass media, namely informing the
audience and establishing an arena for a public discourse. I conclude
that, dependent on problem type and social context (consensus or
conflict), the relative importance of the two functions and the actual
information demand for the information distribution function vary:
While in the popularization and public information mode the
information distribution function dominates, the arena function
becomes equally important in the case of technological controversies.
And while there may be a consensus between experts and laypersons on
what the relevant information is in the case of popularization, there is
partial dissent on the most useful information in the case of public
education and controversies. During communication as public
education experts and laypersons may, for example, disagree on the
perspective used to describe risks. Experts in most cases apply a macroperspective, assessing risks and deriving recommendations on a
statistical basis, whereas those affected by the risks are mostly interested
in a micro-perspective, namely the meaning of a risk for them. 10 In
controversies, experts mostly advocate a scientific-technical evaluation
of competing factual claims, while laypersons (and journalists are
laypersons and refer to them as audience) are more competent to assess
the different opinions and their respective proponents according to
social criteria and, perhaps, everyday plausibility.
If one accepts the (normative) premise that mass media in different
contexts have to serve different functions and multiple functions at the
same time, some implications follow: (1) In media analyses of risk
coverage which are designed not only to describe but also to evaluate
risk reporting (and most analyses explicitly or implicitly have that
objective) a differentiation of media outlets according to social criteria
10 Harold I. Sharlin, Macro-risks, Micro-risks, and the Media: The EDB Case, in
The Social and Cultural Construction of Risk. Essays on Risk Selection and
Perception (Branden B. Johnson & Vincent T. Covello, eds. 1987).
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(e.g. problem-type, degree of social conflict) is more adequate than a
scientific-technical categorization of risk sources covered; (2) normative
standards used to assess media coverage have to be sensitive to the
different risk contexts, communication modes and mass media
functions; and (3) instead of focusing on one evaluation criterion at a
time, different criteria have to be considered simultaneously with
particular attention to ubiquitous goal conflicts between them.
Journalists are confronted with a number of very different
expectations which are altogether legitimate from one point of view or
another. The audience, for example, expects comprehensible and
credible assessments of a risk source or recommendations for adequate
behavior in a dangerous situation (e.g. after an accident in a chemical
plant). Social actors use mass media as means to influence the members
of the public as well as public opinion and thereby political decisions.
They expect mass media to convey their definition of the situation,
their recommendations and demands to the public with as little
journalistic interference as possible (except, of course, a positive
evaluation). Journalists themselves - and with them a number of
political scientists and also parts of their audience - agree on a critical
function of mass media, challenging and supervising the societal elites
and defending the individual against the technical, economical or
political "rationality." Communication researchers like me expect mass
media to form an arena for public discourse open for innovation and
fulfilling certain functions in the adaptation of societies to new
challenges. And, finally, the economic interests of media organizations
require journalists to create an audience willing to pay for information
and/or as a good that can be rented out to advertisers. Many of these
expectations are not just passively held by their respective agents but
actively claimed by means of economic and legal power, manipulative
source strategies and the professional socialization of journalists.
Journalists face a number of goal conflicts in trying to meet all the
expectations addressed to them. For example, there is a conflict
between the aim to provide credible reassuring information after an
5 Risk Health, Safety &Environment 241 [Summer 1994]

accident and the goal of criticizing and challenging the people and
institutions responsible for risk assessment and risk management: A
coverage trying to convey credibly a reassuring message cannot at the
same time criticize the source of this information.
Mass media coverage, thus, may be best understood as compromise
between several competing expectations and influences. This is certainly
true as an empirical fact, but - as I have tried to argue - this is also
inevitable as a response to contradictory normative claims. The media
system handles this problem in certain ways. There is, for example,
some kind of division of labor between different types of media and
media sections and different functions may dominate at different
times. But though, even an individual article or broadcast often enough
represents a compromise completely satisfying neither recipients nor
sources, "objects" of reporting and communication scientists.
The consequences of my main point that several normative
reasonable functions of mass media compete, dependent on problem
type and social context, are twofold: First, a fair assessment of
journalism in the field of risk reporting has to take into account the
particular communication objectives and goal conflicts journalists face
when covering risk topics. And, second, attempts to improve risk
coverage - certainly an important goal - must carefully avoid
optimizing one media function at the expense of another.

